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Abstract:
In their key works, W. Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) and Carl Menger (1840-1921)
introduce crucial behavioral assumptions as these relate to individual and
aggregate economic activity. The assumptions found in Jevons’ work primarily
focus on the ‘Pain and Pleasure Principle’, originally established by Jeremy
Bentham, and how the human characteristic of inevitable variability interacts with
basic needs. Subsequently, Menger’s contribution is centered on the idea that the
value of a good is inherently subjective and also dependent upon human
variability. This inquiry, therefore, seeks to establish that Jevons’ and Menger’s
behavioral assumptions led to their being classified as early ‘behavioral’
economists. Expanding outwards, the field of ‘Behavioral Economics’ can be
described through the use of a commonly assigned utility function that is familiar
in the standard economic analysis of a rational individual – while correcting for
inevitable variations in human behavior. Upon careful consideration, it can be
determined that Jevons and Menger share many similar ideas and approaches with
modern behavioral economists.
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In their key works, W. Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) and Carl Menger (1840-1921)
introduce crucial behavioral assumptions as they relate to economic activity. This
inquiry seeks to establish that Jevons’ and Menger’s behavioral assumptions
classify them as behavioral economists. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics (2008, 433-434), Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume teach us that
behavioral economics can be described as using the same utility function that is
familiar in the standard economic analysis of a rational individual while correcting
for the inevitable variation in human behavior. Additionally, behavioral economists
seek to question the axioms and assumptions posited in standard economic analysis
with the eventual goal of creating a more reflective set of standards by which we
base further analyses. Although both Jevons and Menger contributed to the
advancement of economics long before the consideration and development of
behavioral economics, the question of whether or not they were engaging in
practices similar to those of modern behavioral economists begs being asked.
Certainly, both scholars were interested in developing economic theories as they
relate to satisfying man’s first need: pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain.

Assumptions Advanced by Jevons
In his The Theory of Political Economy [1871], W. Stanley Jevons (1957, 28-29)
begins by immediately establishing Jeremy Bentham’s Pain and Pleasure
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Principle as a basis for furthering his ideas. Essentially, an individual’s primary
motivation for their actions is to seek pleasure and avoid pain. This practice by
Jevons naturally allows the reader to begin drawing parallels between him and
modern behavioral economists. Jevons ponders human behavior rather extensively
in the first few chapters, questioning how pain and pleasure interact in man, the
rationale of a man who looks to the future versus a man (or “savage”) who merely
lives in the present moment, and what a man has a tendency to do once the
necessary needs in his life are met (a concept very much reminiscent of Maslow’s
Hierarchy of Needs Theory, which emerged in 1943). More specifically, Jevons
(1957, 29) introduces the idea that any feeling, whether it be pain or pleasure,
consists of two dimensions: duration and intensity. If this can be accepted, Jevons
then furthers the idea in claiming that the intensity of a feeling is in a constant state
of variation, much like the incessant variation that generally characterizes the
human mind. This can be represented by a downwards sloping curve, as the curve
shape represents the idea that the change is constant, and the level of intensity
virtually never settles on a particular value. From the beginning, the reader may
begin to decipher that Jevons is establishing a constant variation or an
unpredictable quality as a fundamental consideration when discussing the
consequences of human thought and behavior—the byproduct, of course, being
economic activity.
2

Furthermore, Jevons begins expanding his ideas on a particular circumstance
of pain and pleasure established by Bentham: the role that propinquity or
remoteness plays in the force of the interaction with pain and pleasure.
Specifically, Jevons (1957, 33) establishes the idea of anticipated feeling—the idea
that the anticipation of a certain event that will bring pleasure (or pain) impacts our
current pleasure with respect to that event. In fact, there are two dimensions at
work in an anticipated feeling: the amount anticipated to be felt in the future and
the amount of time that will pass until that future event. Here, Jevons is making a
powerful statement about the state of human rationale at any given moment as a
function of not only the pleasure that a person is currently feeling but any action a
person can take or event they can participate in in any point in the future as long as
such an action or event promises them future pleasure. This assumption has large
implications for individual economic activity and consequently for the
participation in the economic markets of a society. For example, Jevons (1957, 35)
posits that this driving mechanism of human behavior provides the primary
rationale for industry and saving as well as for the accumulation of stocks of
commodity. If a man has the particular foresight to consider his future happiness,
he is driven to participate in the accumulation of stocks and in savings so that he
may secure his future happiness, which in turn increases his current state of
happiness. This individual “can always hope for more than he has, and can feel that
3

every moment of exertion tends to realise his aspirations.” Certainly, it is not
difficult to accept that this particular aspect of human behavior plays a large role in
individual economic activity: in fact, several aspects of the market are based in and
rely on this crucial aspect of human rationale.
Jevons begins his last collection of ideas about the variation of utility with a
final crucial assumption: the laws of the aggregate depend on and are determined
by the laws of the individual. While Jevons (1957, 48) mentions this idea
passingly, he identifies it as being one that is foundational to the next several
sections in which he discusses the variation of utility at length. This assumption,
while at first glance is seemingly unthreatening, takes on an entirely new meaning
when entertained through a behavioral economics lens. If we accept that there are
large amounts of variation in human behavior, even within the scope of one
individual’s behavior, is the assumption that we can create aggregate models based
on the laws of the individual the best foundation for a further set of ideas and
projections? Certainly, Jevons has considered this and decided that as long as we
accept the variation in individual behavior, we will accept that any models of the
aggregate based off individuals will almost certainly exhibit this variation as well.
In fact, Jevons (1957, 48) claims that the only way that we can effectively observe
and study what is theoretically true of the individual is to verify in practice the
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patterns of the aggregate as it relates to economic market activity, consumption,
and production exhibited by a large body of people.

Assumptions Advanced by Menger
In 1871, the same year as Jevons’ Theory was published, Carl Menger would also
publish his first key work, Principles of Economics [1871]. Despite the two having
never exchanged ideas on the matter, their thoughts would prove to be strikingly
similar in content. Menger begins the third chapter of Principles by discussing a
theory of value with the resounding main precedent being that value is not inherent
in a good—it is only a consequence of man having assigned a value to it based on
its quality to satisfy a need. Additionally, Menger (1981, 119) discusses such
topics as the difference between value and utility and what distinguishes a noneconomic good from a “good subject to the quantitative relationship responsible
for economic character.” As he concludes this section of the chapter focusing on
the nature of value, he introduces a few key concepts, beginning with imaginary
value. According to Menger (1981, 120), imaginary value is the result of an
individual incorrectly assigning value to a good that does not, in fact, have value in
regard to economic activity or consideration. He goes as far as to posit that “men
can be in error about the value of goods just as they can be in error with respect to
all other objects of human knowledge.” In parallel to Jevons, Menger begins with
5

the assumption that man is inherently flawed and variable. In fact, he may even be
inconsistent to the point of not being able to recognize when he is receiving
satisfaction from a good.
Along the same lines, Menger continues his assertions pertaining to the
variability of man in his further discussion of the inherent value of a good. As
mentioned previously, Menger was forthright in his claim that a good has neither
inherent use value nor exchange value. In fact, Menger (1981, 118) claims this
assumption to be a flaw of arguments previously made by other contributors to the
subject. As it relates to his later assumptions, Menger (1981, 120) maintains that
because a good has neither use value nor exchange value, it has no value at all until
it is framed in terms of how the good may satisfy a particular need of man. For
example, if a group of people find themselves on an island with a sustainable
source of drinking water, the water has no value to the people because no person
may want for water and would therefore not be willing or required to consider
what would need to be exchanged or given up to obtain water. But, if the
circumstances of the island change so that either the supply of water were to
decrease to a point where the share of water must be divided, or if the number of
people were to increase to a similar point, the water would then obtain value for
every individual—because the water is not abundant enough to sufficiently supply
every person on the island, either due to a decrease in supply or an increase in
6

demand, the water is valuable and may be considered in terms of use value or
exchange value.
The apex, then, of Menger’s views on use value and exchange value rest on
humans and their interactions with goods. The reader may make no mistake
regarding his idea that there is nothing objective in determining a good’s value—
he very clearly states in several instances in the third chapter that a good has no
inherent value, and the only circumstance that can bestow value on a good is one in
which the good serves to satisfy the need of an individual or can bring the
individual a sense of well-being. In addition, as was mentioned previously, Menger
accepts and acknowledges the innate variability in human consciousness, making it
clear that this assumption carries throughout the remainder of his models and other
claims. It can therefore be inferred from these two assumptions that the value of a
good is entirely subjective—existing at the whim of the everchanging needs of the
individual—an idea that Menger consistently hints at as he establishes other
claims. Indeed, this creates a disconnect in terms of consistently measuring the
value of a good, a disconnect which Menger is acutely aware of in previous works
contributing to the subject. Menger (1981, 121) therefore concludes the first
section of his third chapter of Principles accordingly: “Objectification of the value
of goods, which is entirely subjective in nature, has nevertheless contributed very
greatly to confusion about the basic principles of our science.”
7

Jevons and Menger as Behavioral Economists
At its core, behavioral economics attempts to consider standard economic models
while correcting for the inevitable variability in human behavior. Therefore,
behavioral economists may attempt to challenge certain axioms and assumptions
concerning behavior by specifically targeting these assumptions in carefully
designed research experiments. For this reason, it can be difficult to compare the
work of Jevons and Menger to that of more recent behavioral economists. Both
scholars published their respective works in a time immediately before the
mathematization of economics became a widely accepted practice. During this
time, it was not necessarily expected of a scholar that he or she should provide
hard, scientific evidence of their claims before publishing them. Economics was
still riding the line between being a philosophical study and emerging as a field of
hard science that required definitive research results before making an assumption
upon which following claims would be based. Therefore, even though many of the
assertions made by modern behavioral economists rely on using experimental
evidence to refute the claims of standard economic analysis, it is unreasonable to
expect that Jevons and Menger be held to the same standard in regard to the
question of whether or not they may be considered behavioral economists.
Additionally, it is for this reason that four more broad characteristics of behavioral
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economists will be considered and compared to the practices of Jevons and
Menger.
The first characteristic being considered is that of behavioral economists to,
according to Durlauf and Blume (2008, 435), “[explore] alternative formulations of
economic consequences to identify preference-relevant considerations that are
ignored in standard economic analysis.” Consider Menger’s second assumption
explored here that use value and exchange value do not inherently exist—the value
only arises out of an individual’s need for that good. Menger’s stake to this claim
relies on the fact that previous thinkers had based their theories of value on an
inherent value of a good that he asserts does not exist due to the fact that value
only exists in the consciousness of men. It may be argued, then, that Menger
challenged previously established economic models of value with a “preferencerelevant consideration”: while previous economic models did not necessarily base
their claims on the preferences of individuals, Menger made a very concerted effort
to do so. Additionally, we may consider Menger’s related third claim: that the
value of a good is therefore entirely subjective as it is determined by the varying
needs of individuals. Menger was unique in making such a bold claim following
the ideas of his predecessors. By his reasoning, the preferences of individuals and
the value of a good are interdependent, an idea that places much more emphasis on
individual preferences as they relate to the value of a good than did previous ideas.
9

Secondly, behavioral economists aim to create a larger focus on the way that
gains and losses are differentially treated. In particular, Durlauf and Blume (2008,
436) detail the efforts of economists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky to
create economic situations using the frame of the actual situation that the
individual is likely to face, most particularly considering gains and losses in
relation to the “status quo.” In this instance, we consider Jevons’ first and most
crucial assumption: that humans are operating according to the fundamental Pain
and Pleasure Principle. Certainly, we know that Jevons placed tremendous
importance on pleasure and pain (i.e. gains and losses), as it was explicitly stated
as the basis on which the remainder of his ideas would rest. Additionally, the
conditions on which he is operating, originally defined by Jeremy Bentham and
one of which is considered above, are comparable to creating a frame for the
situations that individually are most realistically likely to face. The conditions (i.e.
propinquity and remoteness, in addition to others) are an essential component of
the original Pain and Pleasure Principle and are concerned with the pragmatic ways
in which an individual is likely to experience the different situations of pursuing
pleasure and avoiding pain.
The third characteristic being considered is that of behavioral economists to
create strategic concepts and equilibria that integrate the idea of a decision-maker
consisting of many inconsistent selves. The idea, according to Durlauf and Blume
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(2008, 436-437), originates with an experiment conducted by Strotz in 1955 and is
followed by a proposal by Peleg and Yaari in 1973 to create such concepts and
equilibria. Again, we consider the latter part of Jevons’ first assumption that the
intensity of a feeling is in a constant state of variation and may be described using
a downwards sloping curve. The curve model, rather than a model using distinct
levels that occur at regular intervals, represents the fact that a feeling may never
actually settle on a particular level for any significant amount of time. Because this
model is used to describe the behavior of a single person whose intensity of feeling
is in a constant state of change, it may be said that Jevons is painting the picture of
the “many inconsistent selves” that exist within each individual, with each self
only existing for a small fraction of time. Additionally, we consider Jevons’ related
third assumption that if one accepts the variation in human behavior, enough so as
to accept the downward sloping curve as a representation of it, one may also
consider that a model of the aggregate will exhibit this same level of variation as
the model of the aggregate is based off the model of the individual. In this same
vein, Jevons is considering how one might take the assumptions that apply to the
individual and applying them to the assumptions of the aggregate in order to create
a reflective and accurate set of concepts and equilibria in a similar fashion to the
suggestion of Peleg and Yaari 100 years later.
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The fourth and final characteristic of behavioral economists that we may
consider is, as stated by Durlauf and Blume (2008, 437), that if “payoffs are
‘intrinsically’ dependent on beliefs and beliefs are determined in equilibrium, then
types cannot be defined independently of the particular equilibrium outcome,”
where “type” is a termed used in this particular context to describe a mechanism
which is meant to aid analysis of outcomes given a player’s information as it
relates to a problem. This idea was originally set forth by Harsanyi in 1967, who
introduced the notion of types, and was later observed by Geanakoplos, Pearce,
and Stacchetti in 1989. The essential idea to be gleaned from this observation can
be summarized in an even more succinct way: equilibrium influences our beliefs
and our beliefs determine our payoffs. Incidentally, both Jevons and Menger posit
assumptions relating to the individual’s beliefs and how those beliefs influence
outcomes or payoffs. First, Jevons’ ideas on anticipated feeling are an obvious
commentary on the way that an individual’s beliefs influence their outcomes.
Primarily, Jevons outlines the importance of this concept in regard to the success
of savings and accumulation of stocks. In this situation, the benefits that an
individual receives as a result of savings and accumulation of stocks is a direct
result of their belief that they will receive said benefits. Secondly, Menger’s idea
on imaginary value again deals largely with an individual’s beliefs, although in this
context it is in a negative way. While he does not discuss many practical
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applications of this idea, he is explicit in concluding that individuals are not perfect
and can therefore attribute value where no value exists. Similar to Harsanyi,
Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti, both Jevons and Menger rely on the fact that
beliefs, in one way or another, influence payoffs and outcomes.

Conclusion
This inquiry has sought to establish that the behavioral assumptions introduced by
W. Stanley Jevons and Carl Menger classify them as behavioral economists. In
their key works, Jevons and Menger introduce and expound upon crucial
behavioral assumptions as they relate to individual and aggregate economic
activity. Although their respective works were published and considered long
before the emergence of behavioral economics, there are distinct similarities
between the assumptions that defined Jevons’ and Menger’s crucial works and
many of the ideas presented by modern behavioral economists that have so far had
a substantial impact on this new take on classical economic analysis. After careful
consideration of the ideas and practices in both realms discussed here, it may be
reasonably concluded that Jevons and Menger can be considered to have been two
of the earliest behavioral economists. Both scholars operated under assumptions
that considered preference-related activity which previous models did not, had a
large focus on gains and losses as they relate to the status quo, utilized the idea of
13

the individual consisting of many selves, and defined certain consumer activity
based solely in the individual’s beliefs. Certainly, we can see how human behavior
and rationale has continued to fascinate economists over hundreds of years of
development in the discipline.
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